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Abstract
Public policy regulations, designed to legitimate and protect fragile, fledgling 
new firms from failure, on the surface, appear to be of great value. According 
to Stinchcombe, to the extent that such policies serve as “standard social 
routines,” they may even work to decrease the liability of newness. Using a 
sample of more than 2,600 new banks chartered in the United States over 
a 15-year span under the supervision of three different regulatory agencies, 
we find that failure rates vary according to nuances in the differences in 
regulations levied by these agencies. Paradoxically, banks that are initially 
subject to more stringent regulations, intended to limit their strategic 
choices to a set of “safe and sound” practices, and protect them from failure 
during their early stages of existence, in fact, have a higher likelihood of 
failure after those restrictive regulations are lifted. Our results suggest that 
public policy attempts to thwart the liability of newness are in fact a “fix that 
fails,” as public policy regulations designed to reduce the liability of newness 
merely delay the inevitable.
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Introduction
Although it has been more than five decades since Stinchcombe’s (1965) 
liability of newness construct was first introduced into the organizations lit-
erature, the idea continues to be one of the most enduring phenomena to 
describe the difficulties and higher incidences of failure that new firms face 
relative to more established firms in their industry (Thornhill & Amit, 2003). 
Due to new organizations’ lack of reputational capital, organizational rou-
tines, and/or legitimacy with stakeholders, policy makers have focused their 
attention on interventions that might mitigate these characteristics of the lia-
bility of newness. Amezcua, Grimes, Bradley, and Wiklund (2013) point out 
that actors such as governments and universities often sponsor enterprises 
such as business incubators with the belief that the activities that take place 
within these organizations are effective in helping new firms overcome the 
liability newness. Our goal is to test whether public policies designed to limit 
the activities of new firms and therefore reduce the likelihood of risky strate-
gic choices actually reduce the liability of newness and increase the survival 
prospects of new firms.
Research on government-based policy efforts is not uncommon in the 
entrepreneurship literature. Chrisman and various colleagues (e.g., Chrisman, 
1999; Chrisman & McMullan, 2000, 2004) have studied the effectiveness of 
U.S. Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) in improving the sur-
vival odds of small and nascent businesses. In another example, Solomon, 
Bryant, May, and Perry (2013) investigated the effectiveness of entrepreneur-
ial development programs sponsored by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) and found that the assistance provided by such pro-
grams was successful in reducing failure rates. Government-sponsored SBA 
and SBDC programs work by providing new firms with training and access 
to information and knowledge from experienced managers to facilitate the 
formation of successful organizational routines, processes for accomplishing 
organizational tasks, in the new firm. Such programs represent an effort by 
government policy makers to mitigate the effects of the liability of newness. 
Although the successful completion of a program of this type may provide 
legitimacy to external stakeholders, government support of these programs 
represent an indirect effort to manage the risks inherent in new venture for-
mation and increase the likelihood of new firm survival.
By contrast, we are focused on the question of how direct policy devices, 
such as government regulations, rather than indirect or intermediated devices 
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such as program sponsorship, endorsement, or outside assistance, affect a 
firm’s ability to overcome the liability of newness. We concentrate on new 
firms in the U.S. commercial banking industry, where strict temporary regu-
lations are in place to protect fledgling new banks from failure during a 
period of acute vulnerability in their early years. Although well-intentioned, 
we argue that these regulations hinder the development of successful organi-
zational routines and differentially limit the organizational learning capacity 
of new banks, making them vulnerable to failure. And as such, these regula-
tions may not eliminate the liability of newness, but merely shift its temporal 
effects. Finally, to understand the impact of the dynamics of government 
regulations and failure within a population of new firms, we also examine 
whether new banks are likely to experience differences in failure rates based 
on variations in the regulations that they face.
Although our study adds to a large body of work that investigates the lia-
bility of newness phenomenon, it also covers new ground by focusing on the 
value of direct, rather than indirect, government policy-based interventions 
for managing the liability of newness. As Stinchcombe (1965) does not spe-
cifically refer to the impact of regulations, our research contributes to the 
liability of newness literature by identifying an additional external factor that 
should be accounted for in assessing the prospects of new firm survival. Our 
work also shows how government regulations, if not carefully implemented, 
can have a disparate impact on how some new firms handle the liability of 
newness relative to others. The next section will outline our hypotheses about 
the direct effects of government regulations on new firms’ short- and long-
term performance.
Theory and Hypotheses
Organizational Learning and the Liability of Newness
Stinchcombe’s (1965) groundbreaking work argued that new firms were sus-
ceptible to failure because of a liability of newness. Stinchcombe (1965) 
ascribed the liability of newness to a discrete set of reasons that are both 
internal and external to the organization (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). Internally, a new firm is susceptible to the liability of new-
ness because as a new organization, members need to learn new skills, roles, 
and routines (Stinchcombe, 1965); Wiklund, Baker, and Shepherd (2010) 
refer to these issues as “organizational learning problems” (p. 425). Externally, 
new firms are susceptible to the liability of newness because they lack ties 
and legitimacy with external stakeholders (Aldrich, 1999; Wiklund et al., 
2010), a view that is also consonant with an institutional theory perspective 
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of firm failure (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Singh, Tucker, 
& House, 1986). Moreover, these external challenges have also been framed 
in terms of organizational learning—the need to learn about the environment 
in which the firm is to do business (Wiklund et al., 2010).
Close observers of Stinchcombe’s (1965) original article note that chal-
lenges associated with organizational learning underpin the causes of the 
liability of newness (Thornhill & Amit, 2003; Wiklund et al., 2010). Internally, 
Stinchcombe (1965) himself points out that “social relations among strang-
ers” (p. 149) in new firms create learning costs that existing firms do not 
incur. Managers in new firms must learn new roles and routines for accom-
plishing tasks within the firm (Gong, Baker, & Miner, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Stinchcombe, 1965). These internal liabilities are costly from a time 
and efficiency standpoint and exert additional pressure on the already fragile, 
resource constrained new firm, increasing the likelihood of organizational 
failure (Wiklund et al., 2010).
The need to learn about the stakeholders and environment in which a new 
firm operates is an external causal factor in the liability of newness (Wiklund 
et al., 2010). Because new firms start from scratch, they must learn how to 
effectively engage important stakeholders. They must establish legitimacy 
with important resource groups such as financiers, customers, and suppliers 
(Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Singh et al., 1986; Suchman, 
1995). More important, a new firm must learn how to survive in a new envi-
ronment (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Thornhill & Amit, 2003), acquiring knowl-
edge from and about an evolving, dynamic market and quickly transforming 
it into a competence that will bolster its prospects of survival (Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2000).
Baum and Ingram (1998) deem such activities “survival-enhancing” 
learning. Defined as a type of learning outcome that occurs when experience 
decreases an organization’s risk of failure, survival-enhancing learning has 
been recognized by several studies (e.g., Argote, Ingram, Levine, & Moreland, 
2000; Dencker, Gruber, & Shah, 2009; Kim, Kim, & Miner, 2009; Kim & 
Miner, 2007) since Baum and Ingram’s (1998) original articulation. Although 
survival-enhancing learning does not always identify the individual detailed 
processes by which learning happens at the level of the organization, it can 
decrease the likelihood of failure. This is because individual-level experience 
is transformed into organization-level experience using supra-individual 
repositories (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011). For example, individual expe-
rience can be encoded and embedded into organizational routines—processes 
for accomplishing organizational tasks—which can serve as such a vehicle. 
Furthermore, research on vicarious learning (e.g., Haunschild & Miner, 1997; 
Huber, 1991; Kim & Miner, 2007) argues that organizational routines are 
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externally observable from a distance and are frequently replicated by other 
organizations.
Behavioral learning theorists (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 
1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982) have long argued that firms become more 
adaptive through organizational learning. As firms gain experience, they 
learn and expand their library of organizational routines by encoding them 
into organizational memory for use when needed (Levitt & March, 1988; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982). Because of this, firms with broader and deeper 
experiences possess a greater learning capacity than firms that lack such 
experiences. It follows that devices that limit a new firm’s ability to accumu-
late broad experiences are likely to contribute to the liability of newness.
Strict regulation can serve as such device. In the U.S. banking industry, 
regulators restrict fledgling new banks to a finite set of activities that are 
deemed “safe and sound” given the new bank’s relative immaturity. Thus, 
if these strict regulations limit the number of permissible practices in 
which banks can engage, then regulation can have a direct impact on the 
domain and content of learning and affect the nature of the experience that 
banks can acquire (DeVaughn, 2003). However, new banks that face fewer 
constraints on their behavior have more opportunities to acquire different 
experiences and thus may demonstrate a greater learning capacity. For 
example, the “one obligor” concept in banking imposes lending limits on 
the amount of money banks can lend to a single related entity. Although 
the purpose of this regulation is to enforce diversification of loan risks 
(Lovett, 2001), it also serves to limit potential variation in experience by 
circumscribing lending practices to relatively homogeneous, safe, and 
low-risk behaviors. As a result, banks acquire limited organizational skills 
to manage the more complex, riskier lending activities that might be 
important to their future success.
Although strict regulations in general can be problematic, even a small 
variation in how the regulations apply to members of a population can have 
a big impact on how and what members learn (Berta, 2000; Garten, 1991). 
For example, Berta (2000) showed that a variation in the regulatory environ-
ment for assisted living facilities in Canada incentivized some firms to 
acquire specific types of experience at the expense of others. In addition, 
variation in regulations can protect some firms more than others from com-
petitive environmental forces, resulting in differential opportunities for 
organizational learning, routine, and skill development. Firms with greater 
levels of regulatory protection have fewer incentives to search (Miller & 
Chen, 1996) and improve organizational practices (Barnett, Greve, & Park, 
1994). In short, variation in regulation can cause some firms to learn more 
effectively than others.
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Failure During the Extra-Normal Regulation Period
The U.S. commercial banking industry represents a context where strict regu-
lations for new firms are prevalent. The regulations themselves appear to be 
a response to the effect of the liability of newness. For example, each of the 
three major federal U.S. bank regulatory agencies (the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation [FDIC], the Federal Reserve Bank [FRB], and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC]) imposes stricter rules, for 
a period of time, for new banks than for existing banks (DeVaughn, 2003). 
These “extra-normal” regulations are aimed at protecting the new bank dur-
ing a period of financial fragility where its survival chances are low (DeYoung, 
1999, 2000). After the period of extra-normal protection (the first 3 years of 
bank operations), a new bank is no longer subject to these stricter extra-nor-
mal regulations and, instead, must transition into the same regulations as 
existing banks. These extra-normal regulations exist to protect new firms 
and, therefore, embody the basic logic of the liability of newness argument—
new firms are more prone to failure than existing firms.
Although the duration of these stricter rules for new banks is uniform 
across all three federal bank regulatory agencies, the application of the 
rules, specifically how and to whom they apply, are not. This variation 
means that within a population of new banks, different banks face different 
regulatory environments during their period of extra-normal regulations. A 
new bank’s charter type (i.e., nonmember state bank, member state bank, 
or national bank), a choice determined by a bank’s founders during the 
startup process, establishes which regulatory agency (i.e., FDIC, FRB, or 
OCC) will be its primary federal regulator. The degree to which these reg-
ulations vary will affect the regulatory environment that each bank will 
face and, in turn, will have important implications for organizational learn-
ing. Table 1 shows the variation in select regulations for new banks by 
federal bank regulator.
Although it is worth noting that there is overlap in many of the basic new 
bank regulations levied by the three agencies, the differences among them are 
important. For example, although all three regulators require new banks to 
maintain higher than normal (compared with existing banks) equity capital 
levels, new banks regulated by the FRB are required to hold far more equity 
capital in reserve than new banks regulated by the OCC (at least 9% of total 
assets vs. 5% of total assets). This variation in stringency constitutes a mean-
ingful difference in the regulatory environments faced by new banks. This 
difference has important implications for new firm performance as there are 
opportunity costs to holding additional capital in reserve (i.e., forgone oppor-
tunities to invest this capital in bank loans at more attractive rates of return).
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Taken together, a new bank’s charter type (nonmember state bank, mem-
ber state bank, or national bank) determines its primary federal bank regula-
tor (FDIC, FRB, or OCC). This, in turn, establishes the stringency of the 
regulatory environment that a new bank will encounter. Thus, a new bank’s 
charter type can serve as a proxy for the level of intensity it faces in its regula-
tory environment. This allows us to hypothesize about the effect and efficacy 
of restrictive, protection-oriented regulations in reducing failure and avoid-
ing the impact of the liability of newness for new firms.
One of the more dramatic differences in regulation lies in the comparison 
between new national banks and new state-chartered banks (i.e., nonmember 
state banks and member state banks) during the extra-normal regulation period. 
Compared with FDIC-regulated, nonmember state banks and FRB-regulated, 
member state banks, OCC-regulated national banks face far less stringent regu-
lations. Unlike FRB-regulated banks, OCC-regulated banks face lower equity 
capital requirements and are subject to less frequent bank examinations. When 
compared with FDIC-regulated banks, OCC-regulated, national banks do not 
face the same specific, time-dependent profit targets (i.e., “break-even” profit 
by the end of third-year operations) that FDIC-regulated banks do.
Table 1. Select Regulations by Federal Bank Agency.
More stringent Less stringent
 
FDIC-regulated 
nonmember banks
FRB-regulated member 
state banks
OCC-regulated 
national banks
Equity rules 8% equity 
requirement
9% equity requirement 5% “well-capitalized” 
equity requirement
Profit rules Reach profitability 
by end of third 
year
No time-dependent 
profitability 
requirement
No time-dependent 
profitability 
requirement
Bank exam 
rules
Bank exam at least 
once every 12 
months
Bank exam at the end 
of 1st quarter, at the 
end of 3rd quarter, 
and at 6-month 
intervals until a 
CAMEL rating of “1” 
or “2”
Bank exam once 
every 12 months 
and may be 
extended to every 
18 months
Source. FDIC Statement of Policy, FRB Application and Supervision Standards for De Novo 
State Member Banks, Comptroller’s Licensing Manual & A Guide to the National Banking 
System.
Note. FDIC = Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; FRB = Federal Reserve Bank;  
OCC = Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; CAMEL = Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings, Liquidity.
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Moreover, OCC-regulated, national banks have typically enjoyed more 
liberal bank chartering and bank supervisory policies (DeYoung, 1999; 
Rehm, 1989). The net effect of this wide discretion means that national banks 
enjoy more latitude to experiment with a wider variety of riskier bank prac-
tices during the extra-normal regulation period than other bank types and 
have the opportunity to acquire a great deal of learning.
However, this wide discretion also means that national banks may enjoy 
less protection from failure than the other types of banks during the extra-
normal regulation period. This notion is underscored in Rehm’s (1989) 
account of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (the chief executive of the OCC 
regulatory agency) statement regarding new banks: “The agency [OCC] 
should not restrict startups just to prevent possible failures.” Therefore, for 
this reason, it is expected,
Hypothesis 1 (H1): OCC-regulated (national) banks will experience the 
highest failure rates of the three bank types during the extra-normal regu-
lation period (i.e., national bank > nonmember state bank or member state 
bank).
Within state-chartered banks, it is not clear, a priori, which bank type is 
afforded greater protection during the extra-normal regulation period. 
Whereas new FRB-regulated member state banks, for example, face higher 
equity capital requirements and are subject to more frequent bank examina-
tions (“monitoring requirements”) than new FDIC-regulated nonmember 
state banks, new FDIC-regulated banks have stringent, time-dependent profit 
(“performance requirements”) targets that must be met by the end of the 
extra-normal regulation period. New FRB-regulated banks are not subject to 
such performance requirements. If FRB-regulated member state banks’ 
intense monitoring requirements and high-equity capital requirements indeed 
provide more protection, then it is expected that member state banks will 
exhibit the lowest failure rates during the regulation period.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): FRB-regulated (member state) banks will experi-
ence the lowest failure rates during the extra-normal regulation period 
(i.e., member state bank < nonmember state bank < national bank).
By contrast, FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks must meet specific 
profit targets (performance requirements) by the end of the extra-normal regula-
tion period. This may ultimately be considered more stringent and thus provide 
a greater degree of protection. The FDIC Statement of Policy mandates that new 
banks reach profitability (at least break-even status) after a “reasonable” period 
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of time (interpreted to be 3 years by FDIC regulators). By ensuring that non-
member state banks are involved in practices that move them toward profitabil-
ity, the FDIC provides a layer of protection against premature bank failure. 
However, what is not known a priori is whether this level of protection is more 
or less than the level provided for FRB-regulated banks.
If the performance requirements of the FDIC-regulated banks outweigh 
the monitoring requirements of the FRB-regulated banks in terms of protec-
tion (regulation intensity), then it is expected that nonmember state banks 
will exhibit the lowest failure rates during the extra-normal regulation period. 
That is,
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): FDIC-regulated (nonmember state) banks will 
experience the lowest failure rates during the extra-normal regulation 
period (i.e., nonmember state bank < member state bank < national bank)
Failure During the Post-Regulation Period
The long-run implications of ineffective learning during the extra-normal 
regulation period will become apparent during the post-regulation period, 
when protective extra-normal regulations are eased (see Figure 1). Banks that 
were protected during the regulation period by stringent regulations and 
channeled into narrow range of “safe and sound” experiences may find that 
that their limited experience is a liability, rather than an asset as they move 
beyond the initial stages of their growth and development. Their deep 
Figure 1. Levels of regulation intensity associated with bank types.
Note. OCC = Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; FRB = Federal Reserve Bank; FDIC 
= Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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experience with only relatively low-risk activities may leave them ill equipped 
to adapt in their new less regulated competitive environment. In short, the 
library of potential survival-enhancing learning routines (Baum & Ingram, 
1998; Kim et al., 2009; Kim & Miner, 2007) from which highly protected 
banks can draw is relatively limited.
Moreover, organizational routines honed during the extra-normal regula-
tion period may no longer be appropriate or useful during the post-regulation 
era. New, reduced regulations, with which the firm has had no prior experi-
ence, must be responded to through search and exploration. New routines 
must be devised, and existing routines may need to be discarded or unlearned, 
which may require altering organizational features or redistributing organiza-
tional resources (Hedberg, 1981; Thornhill & Amit, 2003).
For example, during the post-regulation period, banks are permitted to 
reduce their equity capital levels to as low as 4%—a 100% decrease from 
the regulation period. FRB-regulated member state banks, the bank type that 
was required to maintain the absolute highest equity capital levels during the 
regulation period, may encounter more difficulty than the other bank types 
in comfortably reducing equity capital levels as reducing equity capital 
increases bank risk. Therefore, banks that experienced low levels of protec-
tion during the extra-normal regulation period may be able to harvest useful 
survival-enhancing learning routines and lower their rate of failure. Thus, it 
is expected,
Hypothesis 3 (H3): OCC-regulated (national) banks will experience the 
lowest failure rates of the three bank types during the post-regulation 
period (i.e., national bank < nonmember state bank or member state bank).
As highlighted in the extra-normal regulation period hypotheses, whether 
FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks or FRB-regulated member state 
banks are afforded more protection depends on the relative stringency of the 
FDIC’s performance requirements versus the FRB’s monitoring require-
ments. If it is determined that the FRB regulations constrain the behavior of 
member state banks more than FDIC regulations constrain the behavior of 
nonmember state banks (i.e., lower failure rate for FRB-regulated banks than 
for FDIC-regulated banks during the extra-normal regulation period), then 
during the post-regulation period, it is expected that failure rate of FRB-
regulated banks will rise and exceed that of FDIC-regulated banks (as well as 
that of OCC-regulated banks) as the limited repertoire of survival-enhancing 
learning routines accumulated during the regulation period becomes a liabil-
ity. Therefore, it is expected,
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Hypothesis 4a (H4a): FRB-regulated (member state) banks will experi-
ence the highest failure rates during the post-regulation period (i.e., mem-
ber state bank > nonmember state bank > national bank)
However, if it is determined that the opposite is true and FDIC-regulated 
nonmember state banks are more protected (constrained) during the regula-
tion period than FRB-regulated member state banks, then the following pre-
diction is expected:
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): FDIC-regulated (nonmember state) banks will 
experience the highest failure rates during the post-regulation period (i.e., 
nonmember state bank > member state bank > national bank).
Taken together, these hypotheses collectively imply a “cross over” effect 
for bank failure rates (see Figure 2). Highly regulated banks during the extra-
normal regulation period will initially experience low failure rates, but when 
regulations are eased after the third year of operations, failure rates will even-
tually rise. For more loosely regulated banks, just the opposite is expected to 
occur: Initially, failure rates will remain high, but after the regulations are 
eased, failure rates will decline.
It is also worth noting that the timing of this “cross over” effect might be 
sensitive to the specification of the post-regulation period. A post-regulation 
period that begins immediately after the expiration of the extra-normal regu-
lations implicitly assumes “instant” learning. This assumption implies that 
new knowledge is rapidly absorbed and assimilated and is immediately 
Figure 2. Hypothesized relative failure rates.
Note. FDIC = Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; FRB = Federal Reserve Bank; OCC = 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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manifested in new observable behaviors without delay. Although reasonable, 
this may be a naïve assumption in the context of this study that uses organi-
zational failure as the dependent variable. Argote (1999) argues that it is 
sometimes difficult to assess the performance implications of new knowl-
edge because they may not manifest themselves for some time. Prior studies 
(e.g., Huselid & Becker, 1996; Olson & Schwab, 2000) have demonstrated 
such an effect. For example, Olson and Schwab (2000), in a study of manage-
rial innovations in professional baseball, showed that there was a 4-year lag 
between the implementation of new practices and observable performance 
effects.
Method
Research Context: U.S. Commercial Banking Industry
We focus on the context of the U.S. commercial banking industry to investi-
gate the effectiveness of direct government intervention, in the form of regu-
lations, on curbing the liability of newness for new firms. This context 
represents an ideal setting for a number of reasons. First, the industry is char-
acterized by sustained periods of concentrated bank chartering activity, 
resulting in a plethora of new firms for study. For instance, during the 15-year 
period of this study, more than 2,600 new banks were launched. Second, the 
results of prior studies set in this industry (e.g., DeYoung, 1999, 2000; Lee & 
Yom, 2014) have shown a consistent pattern of premature failure for new 
firms, suggesting that the forces of the liability of newness are quite strong in 
banking. For example, in a study of banks between the years of 1988 and 
1994, DeYoung (1999) observed that the predicted probability of failure for 
new banks was more than double that of a comparable sample of similarly 
sized existing banks (19.65% vs. 8.93%).
Moreover, DeYoung (1999, 2000) argues that in addition to being finan-
cially fragile, new banks are more likely to fail because they (a) lack estab-
lished relationships, (b) lack market recognition, and (c) have limited ability 
to attract “core” deposits—critical resources that are the lifeblood of banking 
organizations. These reasons are consistent with fundamental components of 
the liability of newness as identified by Stinchcombe: the lack of stable ties 
with stakeholders and the development of trust with customers. These 
resource deficiencies increase vulnerability and the likelihood of failure.
Finally, the U.S. commercial banking industry is a good context for this 
study because of the financial importance and visibility of the industry. 
According to the FDIC, there were 5,410 commercial banks in the United 
States as of September 30, 2015 (the most recently available data). These 
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banks held more than $14.7 trillion in assets and more than $9.8 trillion in 
U.S. bank deposits. This, combined with the fact that U.S. taxpayers are indi-
rectly, if not directly, responsible for bailing out failed institutions, means that 
the industry is carefully monitored by many interested parties. Therefore, 
regulators have a strong incentive to implement regulations to help new 
banks successfully negotiate potential failure and the liability of newness.
Sample
The sample data consist of 2,682 new commercial banks chartered during the 
15-year period from 1984 to 1998. Data from 61,353 quarterly observations 
are recorded. During the study period, 259 new banks failed, 905 new banks 
merged with other banks, and 1,560 new banks were still operating indepen-
dently at the end of the study period (1998). It should be noted that this was 
a particularly perilous period for banks—on average, 178 banks failed each 
year, which actually exceeds the peak number of failures during the recent 
financial crisis (157 failures in 2010).
We use a cohort design for theory testing in this study. This design helps 
to guard against specification biases resulting from left-censored data on key 
control variables (Guo, 1993). Also, consistent with other banking-related 
research (e.g., Kim et al., 2009; Kim & Miner, 2007), we use data on all 
commercial banks during the study period to construct population-level 
variables.
We use archival financial and demographic data from IDC Financial 
Publishing, Inc. (IDC), a publisher of financial data on commercial banks, 
as a primary data source. IDC’s ratings take into account the same criteria 
that federal bank examiners use when they determine a bank’s composite 
performance evaluation with CAMEL (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) rating at the conclusion of a bank 
examination.
The IDC data are supplemented with historical banking statistics taken 
from the FDIC’s website (www.fdic.gov) and the Directory of North American 
Financial Institutions. These additional data provided information for the 
construction of key control variables.
Measures
Dependent variable
Organizational failure. Although failure may assume many forms, for the 
purposes of this study, a bank is presumed failed if one of the following three 
criteria is satisfied: (a) The bank is merged and/or liquidated at a loss, (b) the 
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bank is merged and/or liquidated involuntarily, or (c) the bank is merged with 
financial assistance from the FDIC. This measurement approach is consistent 
with other studies of bank failure (e.g., DeYoung, 1999, 2000; Kim et al., 
2009; Kim & Miner, 2007). We measure failure by tracking changes in the 
unobserved hazard rate for failure (“failure rate”) in a population. Intuitively, 
this approximates the probability of failure for a member of the population 
at any point in time, given that the member has survived up until that time.
Independent variables
Regulation intensity. New banks are subject to the regulations of their pri-
mary federal regulator (i.e., the FDIC, FRB, or OCC). A bank’s primary fed-
eral regulator ultimately determines the set of regulations to which it must 
adhere. A new bank’s primary federal regulator is set by its choice of bank 
charter type. The chief role of the primary federal regulator is to ensure that 
banks under its supervision operate in a “safe and sound” manner.
As described earlier, the regulations levied by the three federal bank regu-
latory agencies are not uniform. Therefore, regulator differences can lead to 
wide variation in the regulations by which new banks must abide. Hence, the 
unique regulatory environment of new banks implies that it is possible to 
develop reasonable proxies for the relative levels of protection (regulation) 
afforded to new banks, based on their bank charter class and primary federal 
regulator.
The relative level of regulation intensity associated with each federal reg-
ulatory agency was informed by archival documents (e.g., Code of Federal 
Regulations, Supervision and Regulation Letters of the Federal Reserve 
Board Letters, and the OCC’s Comptroller’s Handbook). The information 
obtained from these sources suggested a specific hierarchy of regulations. 
OCC regulations were viewed as more liberal (due to lower equity capital 
requirements, lower monitoring, and the absence of explicit profitability 
requirements), whereas FDIC regulations and FRB regulations were viewed 
as more stringent regulations (due to higher monitoring and specific profit-
ability requirements). Thus, relatively speaking, OCC-regulated national 
banks are expected to be associated with low levels of regulation intensity 
and FRB-regulated member state banks and FDIC-regulated nonmember 
state banks are expected to be associated with higher levels of regulation 
intensity. A priori, it is not known whether FDIC-regulated or FRB-regulated 
state banks face the highest levels of regulation intensity. Competing hypoth-
eses were developed to reflect this uncertainty.
Control variables. Our model for testing our hypotheses was informed by prior 
studies in organization theory and strategy (e.g., Baum & Ingram, 1998; 
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Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Kim et al., 2009; Kim & Miner, 2007), as well as 
empirical research on the banking industry (e.g., DeYoung, 1999, 2000; 
Lane, Looney, & Wansley, 1986). This led to four broad classes of control 
variables: (a) organization-level control variables, (b) environmental-level 
control variables, (c) population-level control variables, and (d) control vari-
ables to account for competing arguments.
Organization-level control variables. This set of variables is designed to con-
trol for potential sources of heterogeneity in bank characteristics that can 
affect performance. Five variables were included in our model to control for 
various aspects of bank performance: (a) nonperforming loan ratio, (b) effi-
ciency ratio, (c) earnings ratio, (d) liquidity ratio, and (e) composite perfor-
mance rank.
Nonperforming loan ratio (loans more than 90 days past due/total assets) 
is a measure of a bank’s asset quality. All else equal, banks with fewer non-
performing loans (i.e., higher asset quality) should be less vulnerable to fail-
ure. Efficiency ratio (a bank’s non-operating expenses/operating revenues) is 
generally regarded as a proxy for management quality and efficiency. 
Management inefficiency can increase the risk of bank failure (Lane et al., 
1986; Wheelock & Wilson, 2000).
Earnings ratio (operating revenues/total assets or return on assets) is a 
measure of bank profitability. Banks with lower profitability may be more 
likely to fail (DeYoung, 2000; Lane et al., 1986). Liquidity ratio (total loans/
total assets) is a measure of how easily assets can be converted into cash. Low 
liquidity indicates high risk, which, in turn, is linked to a higher likelihood of 
failure (Wheelock & Wilson, 1995, 2000). Composite performance rank is an 
overall measure of a bank’s safety and soundness—its general risk of failure. 
It is computed using an index developed by IDC Financial Publishing that 
approximates the 5-point “CAMEL” ranking system used by federal regula-
tors to rate banks on a continuum of performance from “sound in every 
respect” to “likely failure.”
Other more general organizational features, such as age and size, have 
been acknowledged by several studies to affect organizational failure (e.g., 
Aldrich & Auster, 1986; DeYoung, 1999; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; 
Haveman, 1993; P. L. Ingram, 1993; Wheelock & Wilson, 1995). These vari-
ables (age and size), as well as the variable age2, which accounts for a curvi-
linear relationship between age and failure (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Kim 
& Miner, 2007), have been included in our model to account for these effects.
Environment-level control variables. Economic conditions, such as a reces-
sion, can have a significant impact on an organization’s life chances. The 
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unemployment rate (unemployment) and the level of personal income (per-
sonal income) are two widely followed economic indicators that have been 
found to influence failure in other banking studies (Kim & Miner, 2007; 
Whalen, 1991). We also include the bank prime rate (prime rate) in our 
model as a proxy for interest rates, an important driver of bank earnings, 
and thus of bank survival (Kim & Miner, 2007). The commercial real-estate 
market is an environmental factor acknowledged by banking industry studies 
to affect bank failure rates (Hanc, 1997; Kim & Miner, 2007; Whalen, 1991). 
Two variables, NCREIF (an index from the National Council of Real Estate 
Investment Fiduciaries that captures investment returns on commercial real-
estate properties) and nonresidential construction (the total number of com-
mercial construction permits issued) are included in our model to control for 
the potential effect of the commercial real-estate market on bank failures.
The level of competition from other financial institutions is another criti-
cal factor that may affect a bank’s life chances. In studies of organizational 
failure, competition is generally viewed as a function of density—the number 
organizations in a particular population (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). We have 
included variables to account for different measures of bank density. These 
include bank density, bank density2 (to account for potential curvilinear 
effects; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Kim & Miner, 2007), and bank founding 
density (to account for the competitive pressures of contemporaneous density 
at the time of founding; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Kim & Miner, 2007).
Population-level control variables. Huber (1991) and P. Ingram and Baum 
(1997) have pointed out that it is possible for new entrants to learn from the 
collective experience of existing participants prior to their own entry into an 
industry—a phenomenon dubbed “congenital” learning. To account for this 
possibility, control variables for congenital operating and congenital failure 
experience were included in our model.
Congenital operating experience is measured by taking the (discounted) 
sum of the total loans of all commercial banks, up to 1 year before the found-
ing of the focal bank (Kim & Miner, 2007). Congenital failure experience 
takes into account the (discounted) sum of the total number of commercial 
bank failures up to 1 year before the founding of the focal bank (Kim & 
Miner, 2007). These variables are discounted to reflect the possibility of 
knowledge depreciation over time (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Darr, Argote, & 
Epple, 1995; P. Ingram & Baum, 1997).
Kim and Miner (2007) suggest that failure, as well as “near-failure” (at 
least two consecutive quarters of poor performance followed by a rebound in 
performance), in a focal industry can result in learning for other industry 
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members. To control for this possibility, variables representing the failure and 
near failure of commercial banks (bank failure and bank near failure) were 
included in our model. These variables were computed by taking the (dis-
counted) sum of the total number of commercial bank failures and near fail-
ures subsequent to the founding of the focal bank.
Competing arguments. We include two variables to guard against compet-
ing explanations for the effect of prior failure on subsequent failure. These 
variables, bank deposit release (aggregated deposits of failed banks) and 
bank employee release (aggregated number of employees of failed banks), 
account for the potential effect of increased resources from failed banks on 
the subsequent survival prospects of the remaining banks (Burgelman, 1994; 
Carroll & Delacroix, 1982). Another variable, bank mass density (total assets 
of all commercial banks aggregated at the state level), controls for the effect 
of the prior failure of weaker competitors on the survival prospects of the 
remaining banks (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Kim 
& Miner, 2007).
Analysis
The hypotheses described earlier were tested using event history analysis. 
The event history methodology allows one to examine failure by making use 
of the information provided by cases in the sample that have not yet failed 
(i.e., right-censored; Allison, 1984). The “hazard” (failure) rate represents the 
instantaneous probability that an event ends in the interval (t, t + Δt), given 
that the event has not occurred prior to the beginning of the interval. The 
hazard rate can be expressed as follows:
h t P t t T t T t tt( ) = + ∆ > ≥ ≥ ∆( )∆ →lim 0 | .
In estimating our initial model, we use a constant rate exponential model 
specification. This model specification makes no assumption about age 
dependence in the empirical relationship between regulation intensity and 
bank failure. Instead, we control for age dependency by including age-related 
covariates (i.e., age and age2) in the overall model. This model choice is con-
sistent with prior work (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Berta, 2000; Kim & Miner, 
2007) that has included considerations of aging on failure. The exponential 
model takes the following form:
h t Xk i( ) ′( )= +exp β β0 ,
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where β0 represents a constant term, while βk’Xi represents a matrix of coef-
ficients for the k covariates. When all of the covariates are set to zero, the 
hazard rate is a constant. All of the “movement” of the hazard rate comes 
from the covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997). The exponential 
model is estimated using maximum likelihood methods, a principle that 
chooses coefficient estimates that maximize the probability of observing 
what has, in fact, been observed (Allison, 1984).
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The original sample included 2,724 commercial banks that were chartered 
between January of 1984 and December of 1998. Of this sample, 42 banks 
were dropped because of incomplete information. This yielded a final sample 
of 2,682 commercial banks and a total of 61,353 observations (spells or orga-
nization quarters). Summary statistics and a correlation matrix of all of the 
variables included in the study can be found in Table 2.
Model Estimation
Model I (Table 3) allows for direct testing of our main hypotheses using the 
beginning of the fourth year of bank operations as the specification of the post-
regulation period. In Panel A (Table 3), FDIC ≤ 3 YRS is treated as the omitted 
category. Thus, coefficient estimates for all other types of banks in different 
time periods are compared with FDIC ≤ 3 YRS. Panel B captures the coeffi-
cient estimates when FRB ≤ 3 YRS is treated as the omitted category.
Panel A shows that failure rate of FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks 
(proxy for higher levels of regulation) is significantly lower than other types 
of banks during the extra-normal regulation period. That is, the coefficients 
of both FRB ≤ 3 YRS and OCC ≤ 3 YRS are positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Panel B (FRB ≤ 3 YRS as the omitted category) shows that FDIC-
regulated nonmember state banks have a lower likelihood of failure during 
the extra-normal regulation period, but shows no statistically significant dif-
ference between FRB-regulated member state banks and OCC-regulated 
national banks. Therefore, Hypothesis H1 is only partially supported (the 
failure rate of OCC-regulated banks exceeds that of FDIC-regulated banks, 
but not that of FRB-regulated banks). Hypothesis H2b, which predicted that 
FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks would experience the lowest failure 
rates, rather than Hypothesis H2a, which predicted that FRB-regulated mem-
ber state banks would experience the lowest failure rates, is fully supported.
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Panels C and D (Table 3) examine differences in failure rates across bank 
types during the post-regulation period where the post-regulation period 
begins with the fourth year of bank operations. With this post-regulation 
period specification, none of the failure rate comparisons was statistically 
significant. Thus, neither Hypothesis H3 nor Hypotheses H4a or H4b are sup-
ported under this specification of the post-regulation period.
Alternative Specification of the Post-Regulation Period
Earlier, we argued that using the fourth year (and beyond) of bank operations 
specification of the post-regulation period invokes an implicit assumption of 
instant learning. This assumption implies that new knowledge is rapidly 
absorbed and assimilated and immediately manifested in observable new 
behaviors without delay. Moreover, we speculated that the pace with which 
new knowledge is assimilated and learning benefits are harvested can be con-
sidered an open question and may depend on a number of different factors. 
This points to additional analysis that considers a delay or lag period between 
the end of the regulation period and the manifestation of learning during the 
post-regulation period.
The notion of a delay, lag, or “adjustment” period prior to reaping the 
benefits of learning has been established in other learning-related studies 
(Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 1990; Denrell, Fang, & Levinthal, 2002; Olson 
& Schwab, 2000). Olson and Schwab (2000), for instance, showed a 4-year 
lag between the implementation of new practices and observable perfor-
mance effects in a study of managerial innovations in professional baseball. 
The consideration of these studies and other factors, including archival bank-
ing documents, suggested that a 4-year lag period might be appropriate. This 
treatment allows for sufficient time to pass so that the benefits of important 
learning lessons can be fully harvested.
Model II: Alternative Specification of the Post-Regulation Period 
Results
Table 4 shows the maximum likelihood estimates for a new model, Model II, 
that compares failure rates during the extra-normal regulation period with those 
during an “adjustment” period (4 years of bank operations after the extra-nor-
mal period) and a new post-regulation “learning manifestation” period (beyond 
the adjustment period of new bank operations) that allows for a 4-year lag.
The results from this model (Panel AA) show that during the extra-normal 
regulation period, the same pattern regarding the relative rates of failure 
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among the different bank types holds (as these variables are unchanged from 
Model I). During the new post-regulation “learning manifestation” period, 
however, FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks (proxy for higher levels of 
regulation) now fail at a rate that is significantly higher than of OCC-regulated 
national banks (as shown in Panel CC); the coefficient of OCC > 7 YRS is 
both negative and statistically significant when compared with FDIC > 7 
YRS, the omitted category. A comparison of OCC-regulated national banks 
and FRB-regulated member state banks during the new post-regulation 
period (OCC > 7 YRS vs. FRB > 7 YRS) in Panel DD shows that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the two.
Furthermore, in Panel AA (Table 4), when the intrabank failure rate of 
FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks is assessed by comparing the extra-
normal regulation period and the new post-regulation period (i.e., FDIC ≤ 3 
YRS vs. FDIC > 7 YRS), the failure rate of FDIC-regulated nonmember state 
banks (proxy for higher levels of regulation) increases significantly (indi-
cated by the positive coefficient of FDIC > 7 YRS). Conversely, in Panel BB 
of Table 4, when the intrabank failure rate of OCC-regulated national banks 
is assessed by comparing the extra-normal regulation period and the new 
post-regulation period (i.e., OCC ≤ 3 YRS vs. OCC > 7 YRS), the failure rate 
of OCC-regulated national banks (proxy for lower levels of regulation) 
declines significantly (indicated by the negative coefficient of OCC > 7 
YRS). This pattern is consistent with our previously hypothesized underlying 
theoretical processes.
Therefore, under this alternative specification of the post-regulation 
period, the pattern of results is largely consistent with the theorized effects 
during the post-regulation period. A “cross-over” effect is observed for the 
highest failing and lowest failing bank types from the extra-normal regula-
tion period to the post-regulation period. This cross-over effect is illustrated 
in Figure 3.
Thus, Hypothesis H3, which predicted that OCC-regulated national banks 
would experience the lowest failure rates during the post-regulation period, is 
fully supported for one contrast (i.e., OCC- vs. FDIC-regulated banks) but is 
unsupported for the second contrast (OCC- vs. FRB-regulated banks). 
Although the failure rate of OCC-regulated national banks is lower than both 
FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks and FRB-regulated member state 
banks during the regulation period, only the difference between OCC-
regulated national banks and FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks is sta-
tistically significant.
Hypothesis H4b, which predicted that FDIC-regulated nonmember state 
banks would experience the highest failure rates during the post-regulation 
period, is also fully supported for one contrast (i.e., FDIC- vs. OCC-regulated 
26 Group & Organization Management 
banks) and unsupported for the second contrast (FDIC vs. FRB). In other 
words, the failure rate of FDIC-regulated nonmember state banks is higher 
than both FRB-regulated member state banks and OCC-regulated national 
banks, but only the difference between FDIC-regulated nonmember state 
banks and OCC-regulated national banks is statistically significant.
Discussion
Our results have important implications for both liability of newness theory 
and public policy. Despite the passage of more than five decades, 
Stinchcombe’s (1965) liability of newness phenomenon remains robust, and 
our study offers no evidence to repudiate this claim. It appears that the orga-
nizing challenges Stinchcombe (1965) outlined more than 50 years ago are 
still a necessary stage of development that all new firms must navigate on the 
path to maturity. However, public policy regulations designed to protect new 
firms from the adverse impact of the early developmental stages of an orga-
nization do not eliminate these challenges, but merely delay their impact. 
Therefore, our research extends Stinchcombe’s (1965) work on the liability 
of newness literature by identifying regulations as an additional external fac-
tor that can exacerbate the challenges new firms face.
We began this article by arguing that government policy makers are among 
some of the important actors who have embraced the widely held view that 
new firms are susceptible to internal and external forces that can derail a new 
firm’s journey from a fledgling organization to a viable going concern. This 
Figure 3. Hazard rate estimates by bank type.
Note. FDIC = Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; FRB = Federal Reserve Bank; OCC = 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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logic is embedded in federal regulations that govern new banking firms in the 
United States, as new banks are subject to stricter extra-normal regulations 
(compared with existing banks) for a period after their initial founding. These 
stricter, time-dependent regulations are intended to limit the new bank to a set 
of safe and sound practices during a time when they are financially fragile 
(DeYoung, 1999). In addition, because different bank charter types lead to 
supervision by different bank regulators, each with its own set of rules, there 
is variation in the stringency of the regulations in which new banks are sub-
ject to during the period of extra-normal regulations.
We find that new banks subject to the strictest set of regulations during the 
extra-normal regulation period (i.e., FDIC banks) are initially less likely to 
fail than those subject to the loosest set of regulations (i.e., OCC banks) dur-
ing the same period. These strict regulations curb discretion and necessarily 
constrain the strategic choices of banks. Thus, to the degree that these regula-
tions effectively eliminate risky choice sets for new banks, failure will be 
reduced. In fact, if we view these regulations as form of standardized con-
trols, then this idea appears consistent with Stinchcombe’s (1965) initial solu-
tion of implementing “standard social routines” to reduce the liability of 
newness (p. 149).
However, during the post-regulation period (after the extra-normal regula-
tions expire), we find that the banks that were initially subject to the strictest 
regulations during the extra-normal regulation period (i.e., FDIC banks) are 
now more likely to fail than those subject to the loosest set of regulations (i.e., 
OCC banks). Moreover, during the post-regulation period, we find that the 
failure rate for FDIC banks (those subject to the strictest regulations) is actu-
ally higher than it was during the extra-normal regulation period. Therefore, 
although strict regulations during the extra-normal regulatory period decrease 
the failure rate of new firms in the short run, the removal of those same strict 
regulations increases failure rates in the long run. As a result of the key dif-
ferences in the stringency and application of these extra-normal regulations, 
we conclude that new firms have different organizational learning capabili-
ties as they move out of their critical early years as seen by the fact that some 
new banks adapt to their new environment more effectively than others. This 
too is consistent with Stinchcombe; he argues that developing social routines 
for letting managers exercise a degree of initiative (“the sense of responsibil-
ity for getting the job done rather than doing as they are told”) is more impor-
tant than implementing standard social routines and “greatly reduces the 
liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 149).
Taken together, stricter regulations appear to have the anticipated effect of 
attenuating failure initially during the extra-normal regulation period but the 
unanticipated effect of actually increasing failure in the post-regulation 
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period. So much so that the elevated likelihood of failure for strictly regulated 
(FDIC) banks in the long run is significantly higher than that of the more 
loosely regulated (OCC) banks. This counterintuitive finding is an unin-
tended consequence of the extra-normal regulations; a policy intervention 
that was designed to buffer new firms from failure may in fact exacerbate the 
conditions that contribute to the liability of newness and make the new firms 
more vulnerable to failure in the long run. Moreover, as Stinchcombe (1965) 
does not specifically consider the impact of regulations, our research contrib-
utes to the liability of newness literature by identifying an additional external 
factor that contributes to the perils that new firms face. We suggest that by 
constraining the strategic options available to an organization, external regu-
lations limit the development of important organizational routines that might 
prove beneficial in reducing the liability of newness.
Placing the results of this work in the context of other banking studies, 
particularly Leary and DeVaughn (2009) who studied the determinants of a 
successful new bank launch, we find a consistent thread regarding regulation. 
Similar to this study, Leary and DeVaughn (2009) showed that banks that 
attempted to launch under conditions of high regulation (by choosing a single 
bank holding company structure) were unsuccessful compared with banks 
that chose a different, less regulated organizational form, again, calling into 
question the value of stricter regulations for nascent and new firms.
This begs the larger question of whether policy interventions, either indi-
rect (e.g., sponsorship programs) or direct (e.g., regulations), as we examine 
here, are useful at all in mitigating the liability of newness. Although 
Amezcua, Grimes, Bradley, and Wiklund (2013) take a contingent view on 
the effectiveness of such interventions (finding that university-sponsored 
business incubators were effective in reducing failure rates only under certain 
conditions), based on our results, we are inclined to take a more pessimistic 
view, even suggesting that in some circumstances, such interventions may 
actually be harmful.
Public Policy Implications
Because new banks achieve remarkably different outcomes during the post-
regulation period and these differences appear to be correlated with the level 
of the regulations levied by federal bank regulators, perhaps federal regula-
tors should revisit extra-normal new bank regulations. Overall, the differ-
ences in the intensity of regulations from federal bank regulator to federal 
bank regulator can create disparities in learning capacities and ultimately 
affect the survival odds of the different types of banks. Thus, from a policy 
standpoint, one way to limit the number of bank failures may be to reduce the 
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variation in regulations from agency to agency. Although the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) was founded in large 
part to “make recommendations to promote uniformity in the supervision of 
financial institutions,” clearly, uniformity across the various regulatory agen-
cies is still a work in progress.
From a practical perspective, public policy makers face a dilemma: They 
can either stand idle while new firms bear the full brunt of market forces, 
acknowledging that some nontrivial number of them will fail in their early 
years or they can take action by adopting regulations that try to buffer and 
protect new firms from failure, even though such attempts are often futile. In 
high-profile and important industries in which the public is a significant 
stakeholder, neither alternative may be politically palatable given the public’s 
aversion for bank failures and bail outs. However, new firms that are market-
tested stand the best chance of long-run success, as any benefit from protec-
tion-oriented regulation is likely to be ephemeral. This is an uncomfortable 
truth that policy makers and the public alike may need to endure.
Limitations and Future Research
One potential threat to the internal validity of this study is selection. The 
selection threat arises due to the fact that new banks do not randomly select a 
bank charter class (i.e., nonmember state bank, member state bank, or national 
bank) when they initially organize. This could pose a problem as we argue 
that bank charter class can be viewed as a proxy for specific levels of regula-
tion. Therefore, if a bank can purposefully select its bank charter and thus 
affect its level of regulation, it might be able to deterministically influence its 
survival chances by selecting the optimal bank charter class at its inception. 
In addition, the bank charter class could be serving as a proxy for other key 
causal variables in our model and its effect could be due to those variables 
rather than the degree of protection involved.
While the line of reasoning concerning the optimal charter class is plau-
sible, it is probably unlikely. First, to “game the system,” a new bank would 
have to invest in an enormous amount of careful research and ongoing moni-
toring to keep track of each bank failure by charter class and then infer the 
optimal bank charter class for its long-term success. This would be an 
extremely burdensome task, especially in light of the operational challenges 
that a new bank is likely to encounter in its fledgling state. Moreover, as 
Miner, Kim, Holzinger, and Haunschild (1999) state, “to gain information on 
failures in many other organizations would impose unrealistic information 
gathering and processing demands, especially given the difficulty organiza-
tions have in learning from their own experience” (p. 210).
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In addition, given the complex temporal relationship between bank charter 
class and failure, gaming the system would seem even more unlikely. As we 
find, the bank charter class that reduces the risk of failure in the short term 
may in fact increase the risk of failure in the long term, creating more uncer-
tainty regarding the optimal bank charter class. Moreover, if minimizing the 
level of regulation were the most important reason for selecting a specific 
bank charter class, one would expect most banks to opt for the charter class 
than poses the least burdensome regulatory environment, in this case, a 
national bank charter. However, based on historical data of new bank char-
ters, this does not hold—from 1935 to 1998, only 37% of new charters were 
national bank charters (Lovett, 2001).
A final limitation of our study is that we focus on a single, highly regulated 
industry. However, several industries in the United States share a similar 
regulated context, including pharmaceuticals, medical devices, transporta-
tion, consumer products, and other financial services (such as insurance) 
where our findings might also be relevant. Moreover, we suggest that our 
results could be generalizable to other contexts where firms transition from 
protected into unprotected markets. For example, in international trade, gov-
ernments may choose to protect their “infant industries” by erecting trade 
barriers so that these industries are shielded from the true dynamics of com-
petition and afforded the time to develop and grow prior to competing glob-
ally. Given the strong parallels to our study context, our results should inform 
country trade managers of the risks associated with such policies. Our results 
should give pause to such policies.
Although we argue that stringent regulations placed on new firms contrib-
ute to the liability of newness by undermining the acquisition and develop-
ment of adaptive organizational routines for future use, we do not specify 
distinct, internal practices that are likely to increase a firm’s survival odds. 
Future research should investigate typical new firm strategies to determine if 
a set of such practices can be reliably identified. For example, both DeYoung 
(2000) and Lee and Yom (2014) point out that new banks typically fail 
because of an accumulation of nonperforming (bad) loans. However, how 
and why these loans become nonperforming is unclear; research that focuses 
on the precise internal policies that lead to such an outcome would improve 
our understanding of the process and be of great value.
Conclusion
Although public policy makers realize that liability of newness exists, policy 
interventions such as restrictive extra-normal regulations, designed to buffer, 
fragile, fledgling new banks from failure in the short run, may in fact, be 
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more harmful than helpful in the long run by impairing the banks’ opportu-
nity to learn in the short term and its capacity to adapt in the long term. This 
might be a cautionary tale that interventions, whether they be public policies, 
new technologies, or new business practices, are still not enough to overcome 
the persistent power of the liability of newness.
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